On Legislative Power

May 9, 2013October 6, 2013 / gouverneurmorris / Leave a comment

Coolidge knew how to exercise the energy of executive power in calculated doses for maximum effect. Despite the stereotypical impression that he slept through the White House years, a false impression attributed to a later Chief Executive by the name of Ronald Reagan, he understood the use of authority better than most, especially of the executive variety. The independence of Congress, a co-equal in the division of power, was no less imperative to Coolidge.

As a freshman state legislator, Coolidge was not exactly a greenhorn to politics. He had already served as a town councilman, bank legal counsel, city solicitor, clerk of courts and chairman for the Northampton Republican Committee, all by age 34. He had crafted municipal policy before, represented the interests of others both in his practice and in his duties as legal council and city solicitor, learning the law well. Always an active listener and continual thinker, he said little because he truly believed, “He who gives license to his tongue only discloses the content of his own mind. By the excess of words he proclaims his lack of discipline.” Even as he would come to build a record that included direct election of Senators, minimum wage laws, women’s suffrage, transportation regulation, restriction of child labor and other matters, he was not simply running with the “legislative herd” in order to keep pace with a clamor to legislate. While some were running headlong into heavy regulation of rails and Morgan steel, Coolidge refrained. He was not suckered into the movement, quite popular at the time, of breaking up “big business” simply because it was “too big.” He represented the folks back home, to be sure, but was doing so with an informed and conscientious judgment of matters. Even then the full price of what was done would not be understood for years. He knew destroying the mobility of capital and people’s ability to adapt to market conditions, even when it meant unpopular rate increases, hurts not helps everyone, especially the poorest. Legislatures were poor stand-ins for people free to make their own decisions in the marketplace. They may act with good intentions but would leave a trail of havoc that could have been avoided.

Coolidge would later summarize the impact of this period,

The power of legislation has been to a large extent recast, for the old order looked on these increased activities with much concern. This has proceeded on the theory that it would be for the public benefit to have government to a greater degree the direct action of the people. The outcome of this doctrine has been the adoption of the direct primary, the direct election of the United States senators, the curtailment of the power of the speaker of the House, and a constant agitation for breaking down the authority of decisions of the courts. This is not the government which was put into form by Washington and Hamilton, and popularized by Jefferson. Some of the stabilizing safeguards which they had provided have been weakened. The representative element has been diminished and the democratic element has been increased; but it is still constitutional government; it still requires time, due deliberation, and the consent of the States to change or modify the fundamental law of the nation.

It is that slow, deliberate consideration that keeps legislative power independent and people’s liberty preserved. When the Congress abandons that exercise of deliberation and attempt to speed the process without full consideration of the bill, the independence of legislative power is lost. The distinct functions of government are tipped in favor of only one aspect: an energetic executive. Without legislative deliberation, Congress surrenders its central check upon executive abuses. It places decisions that deserve time and thought into the “fast track,” disregarding what harm may come. Coolidge recognized the peril of this transformation to sound lawmaking and people’s freedoms. He differentiated productive collaboration — Congress passing and the President enforcing measures only after thorough consideration –from legislative subservience to executive power.

Speaking in Northampton on Memorial Day, May 30, 1923, Vice President Coolidge articulated the essential distinction this way,

The chief repository of power is in the legislature, chosen directly by the people at frequent elections. Is it this body, which is particularly responsive to the public will, and yet, as in the Congress, is representative of the whole nation. It does not perform an executive function. It is not, therefore, charged with the necessity of expedition. It is a legislative body, and is, therefore, charged with the necessity for deliberation. Sometimes this privilege may be abused, for this great power has been given as the main safeguard of liberty, and wherever power is bestowed it may be used unwisely. But whenever a legislative body ceases to deliberate, then it ceases to act without due consideration. That fact in itself is conclusive that it has ceased to be independent, has become subservient to a single directing influence or a small group, either without or within itself, and is no longer representative of the people. Such a condition would not be a rule of the people, but a rule of some unconstitutional power…An independent legislature never deprived the people of their liberty.

In the haste to “pass the bill to see what is in it” and “prevent deadlock,” the point of properly applied legislative power is being missed on a grand scale. In such an environment, no one can be assured of their freedoms. As Coolidge would say, “A good measure can stand discussion. A bad bill ought to be delayed…Open debate is the only shield against the irretrievable action of a rash majority.”

On Executive Power

May 7, 2013October 6, 2013 / gouverneurmorris / Leave a comment

Surveying the years of public service that prepared Coolidge for the Presidency, Robert A. Woods, in his instructive book on the thirtieth president, reminds us how extensively trained Coolidge was in statecraft. Very few chief executives can lay claim to as broad a span of experience in local, state and national governance as Calvin Coolidge. Yet, through it all he retained an enduring sense of perspective toward himself and the specific duties of each particular office. As Coolidge transitioned from a state legislator to executive leadership in the Massachusetts Senate and from there to Lieutenant Governor, Governor, Vice President and President, he continued to adjust to the constitutional limits of the role. It was all grounded in his respect for and grasp of the office he held. The powers of government were separated for an incontrovertible reason. The powers of making law and enforcing them were not safe in the hands of one man, even if he was that man. The people’s liberties were safeguarded by limiting the reach of each branch and assigning powers not easy to consolidate by any single group or individual.

In the State House, Coolidge became the best-informed legislator by listening and carefully studying each issue himself. When the time came to act, he was decisive and thorough, gaining a reputation as a master of legislative procedure and vote getting. He not only knew the content of the legislation under consideration but had weighed its consequences on those to whom it would apply. It is a measure of scrutiny all but missing in legislators today.

When the time came to direct the Senate, he did so with complete command not through coercive tactics, for that was not his way. He led by understanding his task fully, applying what he had learned with political acumen and exemplifying service. When others paraded their abilities to influence men, Coolidge demonstrated what he expected and let the actions do the talking.

As he moved upward in executive responsibilities, Coolidge continued to observe and learn. He saw firsthand the effects of excessive legislation. He began to speak up on the detriments of passing laws without giving enforcement time to catch up. It also became increasingly clear that executive power carries even greater limits than legislative authority. It was not up to the President or Governor to drum up votes for his own array of proposals and add to the excess of laws pressing down on the people. It was part of the Framer’s deliberate design that wisely diffused power into co-equal, yet distinct, branches of government.

The President was not to fill in with his own preferences what was lacking in the laws either. He was bound by oath to enforce even the laws with which he did not agree, from prohibition in the Volstead Act to the Japanese exclusion in the Johnson-Reed Act. The Congress could not always see the impact of what was being passed nor could it execute legislation without the President’s authority. Both had to work toward laws that would protect what was good for all citizens, not a few preferred above others. This principle took immense self-discipline to an extent that no Roosevelt or Wilson would have easily held to it. It was too tempting for Presidents to be legislator-executives. Coolidge restored the Framer’s balance and showed it can work when tried.

As Coolidge continued to be prepared in proper administration, he came to see ahead of Congress, as his Vice President, Charles Dawes, would point out. He would recognize the appropriate powers of Congress to craft laws but he was equally as determined to protect the powers of the President, as his victories over the removal of Cabinet officials, full exercise of the veto, and foreign affairs bear out.

Mr. Woods, summarizing the Coolidge way, writes,

The impression made by him upon the country is not merely that of the capable executive. His whole front toward life appeals to those who are bearing the responsibilities of existence and know that they must continually reckon with them. He instinctively and conscientiously represents the kind of progress, the advancing moral standards, which the people can agree to, and the Government can embody…He holds that ‘leadership should not be by force, but by service.’

But we are told that he has fallen short because Congress has so little followed his lead…One sort of man might have sought to utilize on a large scale the leverage of government patronage; another might have thrown the gauntlet to Congress as a whole, and to recalcitrant Republicans, whether radical or conservative. Neither of these methods goes with Mr. Coolidge’s type of leadership; and no one can say that either would have been more productive of results…In the conflict with Congress, he acted throughout on the basis of the principle which was well-established in his mind by experience, that in a disagreement between the legislature and the executive, the latter is always at a great advantage with the public… (pp.268ff).

Coolidge would not see the legislature assume the powers of his Office any more than he would take on the role of a lawmaker, venturing into the jurisdiction of Congress. Woods continues,

But it is not difficult to see in Mr. Coolidge, amid all the administrative complexities of his office and all the pressure of material demands upon him, his strong characteristic tendency toward what will advance the higher well-being of the Nation.

Coolidge understood that executive power, used sparingly and with respect for its limits, ensured the full weight of its authority was not dispensed at every press conference or public appearance. Such would only undermine and dilute the potency of Presidential authority. If every utterance was heralded as a monumental event or an historic agenda-setting occasion, it would only impair executive power and cheapen its moral credibility. To Coolidge, the enforcement of the “moral relationship of things” was paramount to the President’s role. Any personal sense of importance or superiority was immaterial. It was not his greatness involved here but it was the sacred trust laid upon the Office that was to honor, protect and maintain the moral precepts of the people from whom he was chosen, merely first among equals (Johnson, “Why Coolidge Matters,” chapter 5). He was not at liberty to supplant those principles with his own notions of “morality.” To do so would squander that inheritance making one unfit for the Office and a threat to the health of a republic.

On Morrow and Coolidge

May 5, 2013May 5, 2013 / gouverneurmorris / Leave a comment

Dwight Morrow, Amherst classmate and one of Coolidge’s earliest supporters, was mistakenly assumed to be among a small, select group of close advisers to the President. He, like Stearns (and nearly everyone else considered “close”) was kept at a distance because Coolidge respected their abilities but knew that the final decision rested with him alone. Coolidge would not entertain favoritism nor allow the perception that he was appointing “friends” to positions over considerations of merit. That is why he refrained from using Morrow’s great abilities for years. When he did appoint Morrow, it was to seemingly insignificant and temporal tasks, such as an Aeronautics Defense Commission or as Ambassador to Mexico. In each case, Morrow acquitted himself better than before. In the process, he established a reputation of sound judgment, unimpeachable character and preparedness for the next task. He was loyal all of his life to Coolidge. In one of the few conversations he had with “Calvin” in college, the future president told him something he never forgot and to which he aspired the rest of his life,

“One should never trouble about getting a better job. But one should do one’s present job in such a manner as to qualify for a better job when it comes along (Nicholson, ‘Dwight Morrow: A Biography,’ p. 87).”

Morrow would keep that perspective with him, even seeing it manifested in Coolidge’s incredible rise. When a friend expressed his amazement at what has been called “the Coolidge luck,” Coolidge’s rising to top positions by sheer “good fortune,” Morrow retorted, “but, he always reaches the second place by sheer merit.” Writing to the new President immediately upon hearing of Harding’s death, he said,

“Three years ago in Worcester I told you in all sincerity that I was convinced that you were better equipped in character and in training to serve this nation as its President than any of the other possible candidates that were being discussed. That conviction was based upon your character as I knew it and your long training in public affairs. I have never changed that belief. The greatest responsibility that rests upon any man in the world has now come to you. No former Vice President who succeeded to the Presidency by the death of the President was confronted with responsibilities as great. Your whole life’s training fits you for your mighty task; and the faith that you expressed in the closing line of your short statement made in Vermont is the faith that all your real friends will share…”

Similar to Coolidge, Morrow was inspired to public service by Professor Garman at Amherst. Morrow would be a competent observer of people all of his life. He was not far behind Frank W. Stearns in seeing more to Coolidge than most did. Coolidge, as he prepared to leave the Presidency, would give his finest tribute of Morrow’s abilities by recommending to Herbert Hoover that Morrow become the next Secretary of State. Coolidge would never interject his preferences on Hoover, save this one time. The fact that it was for Morrow speaks volumes. It underscored the sharp differences between Coolidge and Hoover that the latter imprudently refused.

Years before, however, Morrow would try to explain himself to Stearns before giving some advice he knew Stearns could relay to Coolidge, “You may look upon me, because of my associations, as a conservative, but I really think I have been all my life something of a radical. I have tried, of course, to be radical along lines that would help instead of along lines that would simply throw the existing machinery out of gear.” A reminder to many a modern “activist” that one does not need to “scrap the foundations” to best improve current conditions. Morrow continued, explaining to the businessman, that there are two basic types of people, in a way far more fundamental than Party allegiance or even political alignment,

“For the last year I have been abroad dealing with all sorts of government officials. Some of them have been Socialists like [Albert] Thomas, the great Socialist leader in France. Some of them have come from old conservative families, like Lord Robert Cecil, son of the Marquis of Salisbury. I have about come to the conclusion that the division of the people of the world is not really between conservative and radical, but between people that are real people and people that are not. Calvin is one of the fellows who is real. He really wants to make things better, not to pretend to make them better…” (Nicholson 231).

Dwight W. Morrow in 1925. His sudden death in the fall of 1931 would be a profound loss to the country, and lay an even heavier grief upon one of his oldest friends, Calvin Coolidge.