On Scandals

As the details became known of what had transpired when government officials used patronage on friends in favored businesses, President Coolidge would set the tone, in February 1924. Coolidge would explain how he and those under his authority would act to restore integrity, punish the guilty and represent all, not merely a preferred few, Americans,

“Character is the only secure foundation of the state. We know well that all plans for improving the machinery of government and all measures for social betterment miserably fail, and the hopes of progress wither, when corruption touches administration. At the revelation of greed making its subtle approaches to public officers, of the prostitution of high place to private profit, we are filled with scorn and indignation. We have a deep sense of humiliation at such gross betrayal of trust, and we lament the undermining of public confidence in official integrity. But we cannot rest with righteous wrath; still less can we permit ourselves to give way to cynicism. The heart of the American people is sound…For us, we propose to follow the clear, open path of justice. There will be immediate, adequate, unshrinking prosecution, criminal and civil, to punish the guilty and to protect every national interest. In this effort there will be no politics, no partisanship. It will be speedy, it will be just. I am a Republican but I cannot on that account shield any one because he is a Republican. I am a Republican, but I cannot on that account prosecute any one because he is a Democrat…Distressing as this situation has been, it has its reassuring side. The high moral standards of the people were revealed by their instant reaction against wrongdoing.”

The same high standards are maintained when we, the sovereign people, hold our officials to account for mismanagement and dereliction of their sworn duties. Coolidge did more than outline what needed to be done, he did it by appointing a special counsel team to investigate and prosecute both civil and criminal wrongs, by issuing executive orders commanding entire departments be turned upside down to provide all the information investigators requested, by firing his Attorney General for refusing to comply, and welcoming the start of litigation well before the elections of 1924, even when it could have destroyed his chances for election. His clarity in both word and deed demonstrated the right way to handle government abuse of authority, even when it concerned inherited circumstances. Contrary to Hillary Clinton, it still makes a difference at this point.

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On Investigations

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   Special Counsel, Owen Roberts (left) and Atlee Pomerene (right) on the case, February 1924.

 “[They] left no stone unturned to win their case. No avenue of evidence was left unexplored, and no pains or expense were spared in preparing for trial. The government’s side could not have been in more able hands. The skill with which the evidence was amassed and arranged, and the ability with which it was presented to the jury, left no possible room for adverse criticism. Messrs. Roberts and Pomerene adhered to the finest traditions of American jurisprudence throughout the preparatory and trial stages of this celebrated case; and no one who followed the case could doubt that if a verdict of guilty had been forthcoming it would have been due to the extraordinary efforts and ability of the government’s counsel”The Washington Post, December 17, 1926, p.29

In the memories of some, special prosecutors hearken back to the days of Archibald Cox and the “Saturday Night Massacre” in 1973. Many more recall the investigation that culminated in 1999 of the Clintons by independent counsel, Kenneth Starr. As a result of that historic sequence of events the statute authorizing the office of an independent counsel, selected by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, was allowed to expire. Consequently, it is widely regarded as an inherently dangerous and abusive office. In both occasions, the political hype and overall disruption to the country increased through the way wrongdoing in high public office was handled. The punishment for breaking the law should fall on those who commit the crime. Oftentimes, this does not happen. It tends to magnify into a frenzy of posturing, false accusations, collateral damage, denials, obstruction and a pursuit of scapegoats in the effort to avoid blame. Such is destructive to the trust the people place in their government to be responsible, fair and lawful.

It is not to say the fault belongs with the investigators, who generally are conscientious public servants exercising their legal responsibilities to find the facts. Such was the case with the Mr. Starr. It is usually the conduct of elected officials, as well as the press, when they attempt to capitalize on either the sensationalism or help destroy an opponent’s reputation and agenda. Such attitudes were present in 1973 and again in 1999. All of these conditions were possible in 1924, yet the way the investigation of each case was conducted protected the peace of the country by upholding the fair and orderly process of law. The fact that the scandals of the Harding administration did not engulf the country anew in lasting doubt and fear is a testament to the abiding worth of integrity, sound judgment and active administration of justice. It was thanks to Coolidge that each of these qualities held firm at so early (for him) and crucial a time to keep the country at peace under the authority of law binding all, from the President to the smallest citizen.

The Senate, tipped off by constituents to possible abuses of officials in Harding’s administration, opened an official inquiry. Democrats and Progressives were swift to crow about “corruption” of big business, before any of the facts were known. The young wife of Franklin D. Roosevelt even mounted a large tea pot onto her automobile as the campaign of 1924 would begin to ramp up: the hopes of Democrats everywhere that this was the opportunity to discredit the Republican Party. As the network of connections to those suspected unfolded, however, it became obvious that both Democrats, even as illustrious as former Treasury Secretary McAdoo, and Republicans, including the popular Albert B. Fall (former Senator of New Mexico and current Secretary of the Interior) were involved. Implicating those of both parties, as Coolidge had asserted it would, the Senate quietly closed down their inquiry, deferring to the course of action mapped out by the President.

Preempting the Senate, President Coolidge acted quickly to curb both the demands for Cabinet resignations and an open-ended search for guilt that tended to characterize Congressional inquiries. He worked to restore the primacy of the law to the process, appointing a special counsel to investigate the evidence for prosecution and then direct the litigation that followed.

Some important observations emerge from how Coolidge handled the situation that would help restore the respect for law and fairness, especially in our current situation.

First, the special counsel was kept outside of the Justice Department entirely. As the accusations went public, the man who had been Harding’s closest friend was also the Attorney General of the United States. Attorney General Daugherty seemed too close to the suspects at every turn of the inquiry that he was not regarded as trustworthy with pursuing an honest investigation. Coolidge recognized that credible third parties were necessary to achieve a just result. Appointment by the President and confirmation by the Senate of the special counsel protected this credibility from the outset of the investigation. As leadership of the Justice Department transitioned to trustworthy hands first under Stone and then Sargent, greater collaboration between the special counsel and the Attorney General developed, only after this initial step to establish its credibility was demonstrated. The Attorney General was still not in charge of the case.

Second, the special counsel consisted of two men from both political parties. Owen Roberts was a Republican. Atlee Pomerene was a Democrat. Coolidge’s first duo was withdrawn when discovered they had connections to the oil companies involved. A team, as opposed to only one person, gave greater weight to the integrity and objectivity of their findings. It is already noted that Coolidge, to the ire of some, reminded antagonists that this was an apolitical issue. It was a problem that required not partisan arrogance but cooperation from everyone to suspend judgment until the facts were known. This is why the President firmly resisted all demands for the resignation of Cabinet members. He would not give in to a “lynch mob” presumption of guilt. Without evidence, short of due process, he would not be forced to give weight to the mere “seriousness of the charge” above that of actual proof. Navy Secretary Denby would resign on his own (guilty of nothing more than stupidity). Attorney General Daugherty would only be requested to resign by Coolidge when he failed to comply with a request for documents by the special counsel.

Third, the special counsel comprised two men of competent, conscientious ability. Neither man were nationally renowned lawyers nor were they specialists in public land law, but Coolidge chose them for more important reasons: they were meticulous men of character. They took their task seriously and in the end, they proved more than up to the responsibility.

Fourth, the special counsel was responsible for specific charges against the accused. The case against the accused did not proceed along an unending search for criminal activity. Malfeasance, in the form of accepting a bribe that defrauded the government, was the heart of the their work. Evidence was collected from the Senate inquiry, the Department of Justice, the Navy Department and extensive testimony of witnesses. Within a month of beginning their efforts, the evidence confirmed bribes had been accepted by the Secretary of the Interior. Indictments were issued and over the next six years the courts proceeded to hear two civil and six criminal cases involving those charged with the crime. One, Albert B. Fall, would be found guilty and sent to prison in October 1929. Another would be found in contempt of court for hiring detectives to follow the members of the jury. Still others would be acquitted by jury but the special counsel, in each case, did its job responsibly.

Fifth, the special counsel retained the cooperation of both the President and the Congress. Instead of playing political games with each new item to come to light, the special counsel team was chosen, confirmed and annual appropriations disbursed by the President from Congress. President Coolidge, from the very start, set the tone of cooperation with these outside fact finders, ensuring all was disclosed. He made clear his door remained open to any and all assistance they would require and then he got out of their way. He never intruded upon their duties, obstructed their endeavors or imposed upon the process. He made sure they had the funds designated for them to do the job, which was all he needed to do.

These observations are not locked in an outmoded time and place. They recall that political favoritism is not new. It is when government officials use their authority to reward those they prefer, be they in business or likewise in government, that the trust placed in them by the people is destroyed. Coolidge rejected this notion of rewarding certain industries or businesses with political advantages. His belief in constructive economy served for the good of everyone across the country, not just those who supported him.

These observations also recall that the special counsel can be properly deployed against crimes at the highest levels of government. A wise statesman once cleared this path and it would serve us well to reflect on its successes, not merely its failures. America will be better served when a renewed respect for law is exemplified by its leaders.

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On Jefferson, Impeachment of Judges and State Nullification

“President Jefferson seems to have entertained the opinion that even the Supreme Court should be influenced by his wishes and that failing in this a recalcitrant judge should be impeached by a complaisant Congress. This brought him into sharp conflict with John Marshall, who resisted any encroachment upon the independence of the Court. In this controversy the position of Marshall has been vindicated…In spite of all his greatness, anyone who had as many ideas as Jefferson was bound to find that some of them would not work. But this does not detract from the wisdom of his faith in the people and his constant insistence that they be left to manage their own affairs. His opposition to bureaucracy will bear careful analysis, and the country could stand a great deal more of its application. The trouble with us is that we talk about Jefferson but do not follow him. In his theory that the people should manage their government, and not be managed by it, he was everlastingly right” (Calvin Coolidge, ‘The Autobiography,’ pp.214-5).

The independence of the Judiciary, even with the partisan campaigning of Justice Chase and perceived activism of Marshall, was the larger issue. If the courts were to retain autonomy as an equal branch in the national government without manipulation by the President or reprisal from Congress, it had to stand firm. Asserting its independence kept it from becoming subservient to either form of interference. It preserved the ability of the people to find justice. If the Court had simply deferred, the people would have lost liberty, having no legal recourse or remedy from either Executive will or Legislative preference. It maintained the Constitutional equilibrium and kept the courts open to the people’s claims.

Due to the intense unpopularity of the Eighteenth Amendment, ushering in Prohibition, the states sought to find ways to override it. Nullification, even in the leading state of Massachusetts became a distinct possibility. The state legislature went so far as to pass a bill making possible the sale of small amounts of beer and alcohol in the state. It was a direct challenge to make void a Constitutional amendment by legislative act. It came to Governor Coolidge’s desk in May of 1920. Vetoing the measure with a firm rebuke, Coolidge registered his dissent, “There can be no constitutional instruction to do an unconstitutional act. The authority of the law is questioned in these days all too much. The binding obligation of obedience against personal desire is denied in many quarters. if these doctrines prevail all organized government, all liberty, all security are at an end. Force alone will prevail. Can those intrusted with the gravest authority set any example save that of the sternest obedience to law? Can Massachusetts afford to take any position which may turn out to be, which can anywhere be interpreted to be, an act of nullification? If rights are infringed the way to the court is open. The cases are pending which will undoubtedly decide the question here raised. Let the Supreme Court of the United States talk. The Massachusetts method of determining the authority of the law ought always to be by litigation and never by nullification, which is legislative direct action” (Coolidge, ‘The Price of Freedom,’ p.407).

It is clear that while in recent years state and federal legislation, allowed to pass without due deliberation for all concerned, is seeking but does not possess Constitutional supremacy. They are legislative acts not Constitutional Amendments. They are the products of surrendering legislative independence to the will either of the Executive or the pressure lobbied upon them by interested minorities. To a natural law theorist like Coolidge, such actions are neither right nor representative of true law. The Amendment process, ignored because the legislation is not widely desired or supported, has been supplanted by making legislatures and even courts defer to hastily crafted and recklessly passed rules for society. Even so, to Coolidge, nullification was not the answer. The Constitution did not protect the right of states to do wrong any more than it did the National Government. If the law is to change, state nullification was not the way to accomplish it. Both repeal and the Constitutional amendment process are available means.

Until then, the courts must retain their independence from Congress, the President and political pressure groups to hear claims impartially and without interference. Unpopular legislation will undo itself when reality catches up to administration. The states already possess the power of implementation and will expose bad laws for what they are until repeal occurs. But nullification, such as that argued by Thomas Woods, reaches outside the Constitutional framework for an escape clause that, when it functioned under the Articles of Confederation, did not prevent the chaos that ensued.

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